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debate-notably in the work of Mark Johnson and Maxine Sheetz-
Johnstone-that emphasizes the dependency of conscious life on the body 
and the way in which our concept of mental processes is built on a concept 
of bodily processes. This line of thought is physicalist to be sure (as are all 
the views that Clayton considers), but it is not reductionist and is fully con-
sistent with a robust view of an autonomous mental life. It would seem 
that this is an approach to the mind that Clayton should pay some atten-
tion to. Why doesn't he? I suggest that Clayton isn't interested in identify-
ing mind-body connections that are being worked out by cognitive scien-
tists, and in applying them by analogy to God's nature, because there is no 
place in God for the physical. To press the panentheistic analogy too close-
ly would make it too close for theological comfort. 
Clayton seeks a rapprochement with science, and he goes some way 
toward showing how classical theistic beliefs about divine action are com-
patible with current physical theories and with cognitive science. But he 
cannot find a way to appropriate the physicalist assumption of science, and 
the main thrust of his argument is to reject it. The theological ideas that 
God is pure spirit and that humans can survive death finally lead him to a 
metaphysics of the person that stresses the separateness of mind from 
body, and that downplays the role of the body in human experience. 
Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, by John Finnis. Oxford 
University Press, 1998. Pp. xxi and 385. Price $18.95 (paperback). 
ROBERT PASNAU, University of Colorado 
The study of philosophy's history is often a tedious affair, devoted to pri-
mary texts that seem only intermittently relevant today and to secondary 
studies that offer at best a pale reflection of the great minds they pursue. 
But every once in a while a study is published that sheds real light on some 
historical period, and one feels as if here, at last, some long-dead philoso-
pher has finally been favored with an interpreter worthy of the task. 
John Finnis is such an interpreter, and his new book is such a study. 
Amidst a flurry of important works published over the past few years on 
Thomas Aquinas, Finnis's Aquinas stands out as the most philosophically 
insightful and provocative of them alP 
In one respect this book cannot be judged by its cover, which reads sim-
ply I Aquinas,' suggesting a general survey of the man and his work. The 
subtitle (revealed on the title page) provides an accurate picture of the 
book's exclusive focus on moral and political philosophy, a focus that is 
particularly welcome given the relative neglect of these topics in the litera-
ture on Aquinas. 
In another respect this book very much can be judged by its cover. For 
inasmuch as one knows the work of John Finnis, one already will have quite 
a good sense of the views presented here. One will rightly suppose that it 
offers a detailed account of Aquinas's theory of human action, that it pre-
sents an intelligent and attractive version of Aquinas's natural law theory, 
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that it constantly displays the relevance of this theory to contemporary moral 
and political thought. One will also rightly suppose, unfortunately, that the 
book is written in a dense, difficult, even legalistic style, with thousands of 
substantive footnotes and hundreds of even more substantive endnotes. 
(The thought kept coming to me, as 1 made my way through this thicket, that 
surely this book was never intended to be read by others.) 
What might come as something of a surprise, in light of Finnis's earlier, 
less historical work, is his awesome grasp of Aquinas's vast corpus. (I do 
not use the word 'awesome' lightly: the book features an index locorum 
that runs for twenty pages.) Finnis remarks that, relative to his earlier 
work,"writing this book required of me a wider and deeper acquaintance 
with Aquinas' works" (ix). Behind this remark must lie many hours spent 
working through long, dense Latin texts. The footnotes and endnotes testi-
fy to this wider and deeper acquaintance, and these references will be of 
tremendous value to readers interested in further research. 
Finnis begins the book in a telling manner. "There are some serious flaws in 
Aquinas' thoughts about human society" (vii), he first tells us, but before the 
paragraph is over he is insisting on the "fundamental superiority" of Aquinas's 
thoughts to those of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hobbes. This is entirely 
indicative of Finnis's method, which combines the conviction that Aquinas's 
work is deeply important with the willingness to subject that work to a "sound 
critique" (ibid.). That method, combined with Finnis's considerable philosophic 
talent, makes this a book that every student of Aquinas will want to read. 
One of the most stimulating features of Aquinas, and also one of its most 
disorienting features, is Finnis's unusual strategy of exposition. Rather than 
take the standard approach of setting out Aquinas's views in more or less 
the order in which he presents them, Finnis develops his own structure. The 
strategy, as he aptly puts it, is to "constantly cut across the grain of his 
[Aquinas's] expositions" (14). One effect this has is to leave the reader -
even one quite familiar with Aquinas's work - somewhat at sea. Familiar 
ideas and theories float across the page, but in strange and stimulating 
forms. We are given whole chapters, for instance, on human rights and eco-
nomic justice. The goal, of course, is to establish just how relevant Aquinas's 
ideas are today. And in general Finnis succeeds marvelously. Some may 
feel queasy over his method - which consists in cobbling together passages 
from throughout the corpus, not worrying over whether they are early or 
late, from a commentary or a treatise. But his results are so interesting that 
only a pedant could not be impressed. 
Of course, Finnis is not without views of his own, and one sometimes 
feels him pushing hard to make the texts go in a certain direction.2 So after 
describing Aquinas's awareness of "sceptical doubts" regarding morality 
(56), Finnis offers an argument that such doubts are self-refuting. Anyone 
who "responsibly entertains and affirms" such doubts is implicitly presup-
posing that knowing the truth has value as an end: 
One's getting to know the truth about some topic, one's judgements 
and affirmations being correct - this is something of value, an 
intelligible and understood (not merely felt) good {bonum intelligi-
bile; bonum intellectum} (59). 
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At this point Finnis offers a detailed endnote describing Aquinas's usage of 
these Latin phrases. But what about the argument itself - is that due to 
Aquinas or Finnis? It's clever, certainly, although anyone who has taught 
ethics will be able to call to mind apparent counterexamples: students who 
think that there are no objective values and at the same time don't really 
care whether they're right. Finnis (or is it Aquinas?) might reply that this 
wouldn't be a case of "responsibly" affirming the proposition. But that 
seems to beg the question. It's irresponsible only if the truth is in fact some-
thing of value. 
As for the provenance of the argument, Finnis acknowledges that even 
its initial starting-point, one's taking seriously the sceptical challenge, "is a 
choice and act which Aquinas does not formally consider (doubtless 
because he did not have to address an audience impressed by sceptical 
denials of free choice)" (58). But what does this mean? In what sense, if not 
formally, does Aquinas consider it? And why is Finnis so sure that this is 
the kind of move Aquinas would have made, had his audience been more 
impressed with scepticism? Finnis does not usually play so fast and loose; 
most paragraphs teem with quotations and references to Aquinas's own 
words. But passages of this sort - and this is far from the only one - take 
away from the credibility of the whole book. We are forwarned in the pref-
ace that "my exposition quite often goes beyond what Aquinas says; state-
ments in this book should not be ascribed to Aquinas unless signified as 
quotations or (as often in the footnotes) close paraphrases" (viii). But this 
just muddies the waters further. Despite the many notes, most sentences in 
the book are of course not supported by any textual reference. So do these 
sentences represent Aquinas's ideas, but not his exact words? Or (as in the 
above self-refutation) do they represent what he supposedly would have 
said, if provoked? Or are we to understand Finnis as saying that the views 
put forward are quite often not Aquinas's at all? The reader is left to sort 
these matters out on a case-by-case basis. 
I'll now try to give a sense of the book's contents, making some critical 
remarks as I go. After a fresh and useful biographical chapter, oriented 
toward placing Aquinas within his social context, Finnis devotes a chapter 
to "subject-matter and method." Taking as his key text the prologue to 
Aquinas's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Finnis distinguishes four 
kinds of sciences: 
1. Sciences concerned with the order of nature; 
2. Sciences concerned with the order of thought; 
3. Sciences concerned with human actions; 
4. Sciences concerned with the practical arts. 
Finnis is of course, interested in the third of these, what Aquinas calls 
moral philosophy. But Finnis is also interested in the distinction itself. He 
begins by asserting that these four kinds of science are "irreducibly dis-
tinct" (21), and from that he concludes that Aquinas's methodology is 
"anti-reductive" (22), which leads him to conclude that, compared to "the 
main theoriests from Hobbes down to today ... Aquinas's methodology 
offers a radical and, I believe, clearly superior alternative" (22). Certainly, 
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this is interesting, but it's not entirely persuasive. It makes quite a lot out of 
an utterly conventional distinction, one that remains alive and well today 
inasmuch as we continue to treat moral philosophy as a discipline distinct 
from natural philosophy, metaphysics, logic, or any of the crafts. 
Continuing to follow the Ethics commentary, Finnis distinguishes three 
classes of moral philosophy: 
3a. Moral (individual actions); 
3b. Economic (actions within a household); 
3c. Political (actions within a civil group). 
Finnis shows that 3b sometimes gets construed more widely, "extending to 
'economics' in a wider sense" (24), and this then gives him his subject mat-
ter: Chapters 3-5 will concern morality in the narrow (3a) sense; Chapter 6 
will concern economics; Chapters 7-9 will concern politics. (The concluding 
Chapter 10 offers some theological context.) 
Like Aquinas, Finnis supposes that moral theory requires an account of 
human action. He begins Chapter 3 by discussing the interlocking themes of 
reason, will, emotion, and freedom. Chapters 3-4 then develop Finnis's 
(Aquinas's) key notion of an intrinsic human good. Knowledge, as dis-
cussed earlier, is one clear example of such a good, friendship is another. (A 
rough list is attempted on pp. 83-85.) Human fulfillment (beatitudo) consists 
in the acquisition of such goods. Finnis thinks this kind of account can settle 
some of the larger problems of metaethics, such as questions about how we 
acquire moral knowledge and what makes moral goods normative: 
We are intelligently attracted by goods which are attractive to reason 
by reason of their intelligible goodness, i.e. by the benefits their 
instantiation promises. That goodness, precisely as opportunity, as is-
to-be, is the source of all genuine moral normativity ... (90). 
Finnis likewise takes the nature of these basic goods to reveal the incoher-
ence of egoism. Because human goods are perfectly general - "the princi-
ples contain no proper names" (111) - anyone who grasps the goodness 
of a certain outcome will grasp that "the common good is better than the 
good of one" (120 [=Summa theol. 2a2ae 47.10c]). 
These are of course exceedingly difficult problems, and one passes with 
some relief to Chapter 5, where Finnis descends to relatively pedestrian 
questions concerning particular moral principles. Here he makes a persua-
sive case that Aquinas has the concept of a human right, even if he never 
uses a corresponding Latin phrase. In fact, Finnis wants to establish some-
thing more: that, contrary to appearances, Aquinas's moral philosophy is 
concerned with rights just as much as with duties (138). This is linked with 
Finnis's more general strategy of deemphasizing the place of virtue in 
Aquinas's thought: his discussions of justice, for instance, "are illuminated, 
but also confused," by his practice of organizing morality around the vari-
eties of virtue; "this superstructure can obscure morality'S foundations" 
(187; cf. 124, 156). 
Finnis describes virtue as something that follows from getting morality 
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right, and so he shifts attention to the moral principles that allow us to get 
things right in the first place. This leads him to explore in detail the struc-
ture of moral reasoning. The very first principle of practical reasoning is 
that "good is to be done and pursued, and bad is to be avoided" (86). Most 
moral principles are not so self-evident, but are rather the conclusions of 
practical reasoning. Obviously, no interesting conclusions can be reached 
from the above principle, and Finnis stresses that Aquinas has other basic 
(self-evident) moral principles, above all that "one should love one's neigh-
bour as oneself." This, for Aquinas, is the root of all morality: "all moral 
principles and norms ... can (given further principles) be inferred as either 
implicit in or conclusions from it" (126). If this could be worked out in 
detail, it would be quite an accomplishment. But there's a problem: 
The moral norms which answer the question what human rights 
every person has, and what responsibilities one has in relation to one-
self and others, must be specifications of that supreme principle of 
practical reasonableness, love of neighbour as oneself. Indeed, 
Aquinas says, they must be deductions from it. But he never sets out 
such a deduction. He has no general discussion of the way from the 
highest moral principle(s) to moral norms such as the exclusion of 
killing the innocent, adultery, perjury. He says that the way is short, 
but however short it needs more than one premiss, and the needed 
premisses he does not systematically display (138). 
For most scholars, this would be the end of the story. But for Finnis this is 
just the start, and he takes up the challenge of providing the missing pre-
misses, at least in the select cases of homicide, adultery, and lying. 
These sections are among the most interesting parts of the book. 
Admittedly, the exact connection to love of one's neighbour is not always 
as clear as one might like, and where it is clear it sometimes look trivial. 
But Finnis's discussion is nevertheless fascinating and usually compelling. 
In particular, he offers a detailed and attractive argument for the impor-
tance of marriage and the role of sex within marriage, as well as a subtle 
account of the significance and scope of the prohibition against lying. The 
discussion is somewhat marred by his occasional efforts on behalf of cer-
tain indefensible doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, such as those 
regarding non-coital sex (150-51) and contraception (181 note e).3 But even 
allowing for these passages, no one could come away from this chapter 
with any doubts about Aquinas's status as a leading moral theorist. 
Perhaps the book's most significant interpretive stance - though it by 
no means gets stressed as it might - is Finnis's attempt to ground the so-
called natural law in what is reasonable or intelligible to us, rather than 
supposing that the alleged naturalness of certain actions can itself be a 
basis for morality (99-100 note t, 153 note 91,155,309). Certainly, this read-
ing of Aquinas is vastly more attractive than the readings one often hears, 
and Finnis puts it to effective use throughout the book. But I am not sure 
this interpretation always fits the texts. Finnis claims that the argument 
against extra-marital sex depends on the fact that it is "contrary to the good 
of marriage and offends against love-of-neighbour, and for both reasons is 
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against reason, and consequently against nature" (152-53, my emphasis). 
Certainly, this is true of Aquinas's interesting argument against "simple 
fornication" (Summa theol. 154.2c). But when Aquinas turns to homosexual-
ity and other vices contra naturam, he argues that these are particularly bad 
just because they do in fact go against nature: "in practical matters, to go 
against what nature has determined is the most serious fault and the most 
blameworthy" (154.12c). No further rationale is offered. 
In Chapter 6, Aquinas emerges as an intelligent critic of the unfettered 
market. Perhaps he is even a radical critic, given his view that the world's 
resources are in some sense common to everyone, and that one has a duty 
of justice to distribute to the poor one's superfluous goods (191-92). But 
Finnis is notably uninterested in pushing these texts one way or another, 
and the result is a nuanced treabnent of the theory's implications. Chapter 
7 reads Aquinas as advocating a form of political liberalism similar in key 
respects to that of Mill (228). Chapter 8 discusses the place of law, and 
Chapter 9 extends the discussion to problematic cases like capital punish-
ment, warfare, and tyrannicide. These four chapters are in many respects 
the most impressive and provocative of the entire book, and I pass over 
them quickly only because I am out of space. 
NOTES 
1. Perhaps the most notable of this recent flurry are these: The Cambridge 
Companion to Aquinas, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, volume 1: 
the person and his work, tr. R. Royal (Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1996); N. Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's 
Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); 
N. Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa 
Contra Gentiles II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 
2. Readers of Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Right (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980) will have a sense both of how interesting Finnis's ideas about 
Aquinas are, and how closely those ideas are linked to his own philosophical 
views. This new book, with its strictly historical focus, is very different from 
that 1980 book. A cynic might say the only difference is that here Finnis has to 
worry about pushing the texts in front of him as he goes where he wants. But 
that would be too cynical, ignoring Finnis's serious efforts to get the historical 
scholarship right. In his preface, he makes this interesting remark about his 
deepening familiarity with Aquinas's writing: 
That has confirmed my previous understanding of the foundational prin-
ciples (and Aquinas' subscription to them), and led me to think one-
sided or wrong some common beliefs about his social and political 
thought (including some I held) ... (ix). 
I haven't attempted to discover where his views have changed. 
3. Finnis's brief remark on abortion is exceptionally hard to take (186 note 
n). Despite acknowledging that, for Aquinas, the rational soul enters the body 
only once the body is sufficiently developed to make use of a rational soul, 
Finnis adds, "it seems clear" that, if Aquinas had known just how complex 
sperm and ovum are, he would have concluded that the rational soul "can be 
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and doubtless is present" from the moment of conception. This is not plausible. 
The Church's position on abortion may not be indefensible, but it cannot be 
defended using Aquinas's theory of the soul. For a clear discussion of this issue 
see Joseph Donceel, "Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization," 
Theological Studies 31 (1970) 76-105. 
